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NOTE
FACEBOOK, PRIVACY, AND REASONABLE
NOTICE: THE PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEMS
WITH FACEBOOK’S CURRENT SIGN-UP
PROCESS AND HOW TO REMEDY
THE LEGAL ISSUES
Michael J. Milazzo*
Social media usage increases with every passing day.  One of the
most popular social media companies is Facebook.  Throughout
Facebook’s short history, they have had several controversies arising
from possible infringement on their users’ rights to privacy.  Some of this
is made possible because nearly universally, internet users will sign up
for Facebook, as well as other social media websites, without ever read-
ing the privacy policy pertaining to the website.  Social media users give
up rights, sometimes important privacy rights, but signing up for
Facebook.  While not per se illegal, the users are entitled to reasonable
notice of the rights that are given up in exchange for use of the social
media website.  Facebook’s signup policy does not give reasonable no-
tice to its users of the privacy rights given up by the user.  Facebook
should make changes to its sign-up policy to ensure that new Facebook
users are given reasonable notice to the exchange that occurs with the
use of Facebook by the user.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy, defined in layman’s terms, is the “freedom from unautho-
rized intrusion”1 or “the state of being free from intrusion or disturbance
in one’s private life or affairs.”2 The United States has a longstanding
public policy favoring individuals’ right to privacy, as notably recog-
nized in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965.3 The definition of privacy and
privacy law in the United States has remained relatively stagnant in the
1 Privacy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
privacy (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
2 Privacy Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/privacy
(last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
3 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Griswold found the right
to privacy to be protected by the penumbra of the First Amendment. See id. at 483.
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last twenty years.  But the significance of privacy rights has changed at a
hastened rate with the advent of the Internet and social media.
The use of the Internet has increased tremendously over the last
twenty years.  In 2010, forty-four percent of Americans used the Internet
both inside and outside of their home, twenty- seven percent used the
Internet solely when at home, and three percent used the Internet only
outside their home.4 Further, over half of all Americans use the Internet
on a daily basis.5 Of the Americans who use the Internet, the average
American spends sixty hours each month online.6 The amount of time
the average American spends online each month is now equal to the
amount of time the average American spends watching television each
month.7  Finally, of American Internet users, about seventy percent use
social media websites such as Facebook.8  This seemingly ever-ex-
panding use of the Internet and social media will shape the history of
privacy for the foreseeable future.
“The history of America is the history of the right to privacy.”9 The
history of privacy currently being written is in flux because of the ever-
expanding Internet and social media usage throughout the country.  With
this expanding use of social media comes conflicts between the rights
and wants of social media users and the growing companies that provide
social media services.  The resolutions of such conflicts will shape the
direction of privacy’s future.
Social media users are stuck between two goals that are inherently
at odds with one another: “People want access to all the information
around them, but they also want complete control over their own infor-
mation.”10  Conflicting goals plague not only social media users, but also
the corporate owners of social media websites.
4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: RE-
PORTED INTERNET USAGE FOR HOUSEHOLDS BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS TABLE 1A (2010),
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/computer/publications/2010.html.  In 2000, just over
forty-four percent of Americans were using the Internet. United States of America: Internet
Usage and Broadband Usage Report, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.
com/am/us.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).
5 Catherine Smith, Internet Usage Statistics: How We Spend Our Time Online, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 22, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/22/Internet-usage-sta-
tistics_n_620946.html.
6 Id.
7 Lauren Indivik, Americans Now Spend as Much Time Using Internet as TV, MASH-
ABLE, (Dec. 13, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/12/13/Internet-tv-forrester.
8 Smith, supra note 5.
9 FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HISTORY OF OUR MOST
CONTESTED RIGHT 1 (2009).
10 John Cassidy, How Hanging Out on the Internet Became Big Business, NEW YORKER,
May 15, 2006, at 50, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/15/060515fa_
fact_cassidy.
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The corporate owners of social media websites, including Facebook,
are in the position of balancing two competing goals, attracting users and
business survival.  Social media companies struggle with how to mone-
tize their social media websites without alienating or losing their users,
who represent a large source of revenue, and thus are paramount to the
social media companies’ survival.11 These conflicting goals lead to social
media companies requiring potential users to give up, or more appropri-
ately to “sell,” some privacy rights in exchange for the use of the social
media website.  In order to make money on users and be profitable, so-
cial media websites must collect, sort, and distribute private information
about their users to advertisers and others willing to pay for access to the
private information.
While the collection of private user information may infringe upon a
user’s privacy rights, such invasion of privacy rights is not necessarily
illegal if certain steps are taken.  If users are given reasonable notice that
they are “selling” some of their privacy rights, such that the relinquished
privacy rights are manifestly consideration for the website’s promise to
let the user continue to use the website, the website owner obtains the
rights to use and distribute the users’ private information.  Without rea-
sonable notice of the terms of the exchange between the user and the
social media website, the website’s use of the information borders on tort
and illegality if the terms of the agreement are found to be unconsciona-
ble or invalid.
This Note posits that Facebook’s current sign-up process infringes
upon a user’s right to privacy without giving Facebook’s social media
users reasonable notice that they are selling their privacy rights.12  This
Note concludes with a possible method for giving reasonable notice to
potential Facebook users of the contractual exchange that occurs.13
Facebook’s dissemination of reasonable notice to its users will permit the
terms of the exchange, including the user’s consideration of giving up
privacy rights in exchange for use of Facebook’s website, to be valid and
upheld.14
Part I gives a brief overview of the history of the legal right to
privacy.  Part II discusses shrinkwrap contracting, online “clickwrap”
contracting, and online “browsewrap” contracting.  Part III discusses the
previous public missteps of Facebook, which infringed on Facebook’s
users’ right to privacy.  Part IV discusses Facebook’s current terms of
11 See Eric Savitz, Could the Future of Facebook Be in the Enterprise?, FORBES (Oct. 26,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/10/26/could-the-future-of-facebook-be-in-
the-enterprise.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part V.
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service and current sign-up process, and a case analyzing a previous
Facebook sign-up process.  Part V discusses how Facebook could rem-
edy the lack of reasonable notice of the terms within Facebook’s terms of
service.
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Legal recognition of the right to privacy can be traced to an article
written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.15 But even deeper,
the underpinnings of the right to privacy derive from the protection of
human dignity.16  The principle of inviolate personality is the core value
protected by the right to privacy.17  The right to privacy protects each
individual’s “essence as a unique and self-determining being.”18
Various types of privacy rights existed at common law and survive
today.19  The most important type of privacy right in the current social
media website landscape is the invasion of privacy by appropriation.  In-
vasion of privacy by appropriation was a common law tort where the
tortious offender used “another’s name or likeness for one’s own bene-
fit.”20  The tort is meant to protect an individual’s right to the economic
benefits flowing from the commercial use of the individual’s face and
name.21 This is the right most at risk when a user signs up for a social
media website, such as Facebook, because the websites extract the right
to collect, control, and distribute a user’s name, likeness, and other per-
sonal facts in exchange for the right to use the website’s services.
II. ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING: CLICKWRAP AND BROWSEWRAP
A. Generally
With the advent of the Internet, contracting began to change.  Rec-
ognizing this change in 1996, the Sixth Circuit stated: “Internet repre-
sents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of . . . historical,
15 Richard C. Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging
Unencumbered Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 482
(1990).  For examples of cases tracing the history of the right to privacy, see Rhodes v. Gra-
ham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 476 (Ala.
1964); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (N.Y. 1970).
16 See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 973; Turkington, supra note 15, at 485.
17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
211 (1890). See also Turkington, supra note 16, at 485 (finding that Warren and Brandeis
observed inviolate personality to be the core principle of the right to privacy).
18 Turkington, supra note 15, at 485.
19 See, e.g., “Invasion of Privacy by Intrusion,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (9th ed.
2009); “Invasion of Privacy by False Light,” id. at900; and “Invasion of Privacy by Public
Closure of Private Facts,” id. at 901.
20 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (9th ed. 2009).
21 Id.
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globe-shrinking trends.”22 People no longer need to contract in person or
by postal mail.  Agreements could begin and end online.  Conducting
business online led to the elimination of hard paper copies of agreements.
This in turn meant that the agreements were not personally signed, and
possibly not signed by the hand at all.  The use of the Internet for con-
tracting purposes led to the development of “shrinkwrap”-type principles
for Internet contracts, namely “clickwrap” and “browsewrap.”  Both are
described below.
B. Shrinkwrap
Shrinkwrap is a contract typically concerning a software program,
where the contract is contained within a storage device and wrapped in
plastic.23 With this type of contract came the issue of whether opening
the plastic constituted assent to the terms of the contract, or if more was
required.  After courts in several cases found shrinkwrap to be an invalid
form of contracting and thus not enforceable,24 the pivotal case of
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg25 paved the way for upholding shrinkwrap
contracting.26
In ProCD, the court concluded that shrinkwrap contracts are “en-
forceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to
contracts in general (for example, if they violate a rule of positive law, or
if  they  are  unconscionable).”27 The plaintiff, ProCD, had aggregated
information from various telephone directories into a computer
database.28 ProCD then sold that database to both commercial and indi-
vidual clients at varying prices.29  The licensing agreement, contained in
shrinkwrap, limited the use of the database to non-commercial pur-
poses.30 The defendant, Zeidenberg, purchased the database and ignored
the license when he resold the information contained in the database to
anyone willing to pay his price.31
Zeidenberg’s price for the service was lower than ProCD’s price.32
Zeidenberg could charge less because he did not pay for the upkeep of
the database, as ProCD had.33 The court found that ProCD gave users the
22 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996).
23 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONSAND RAMIFICATIONS 36 (2013).
24 See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3rd Cir. 1991) (find-
ing a shrinkwrap license to be invalid under U.C.C. § 2-207).
25 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
26 See KIM, supra note 23, at37.
27 See ProCD, 86 F.3d at1449.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 1449–50.
30 See id. at 1450.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
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option to accept the terms of the shrinkwrap contract by using the
software after having an opportunity to read the licensing terms.34 Fur-
ther, the court found that Zeidenberg did assent because the software
forced him to read the license when installed.35 Finally, the court held
that while a contract is usually formed by paying a price and walking out
of a store, U.C.C. § 2-204(1) permits contracts to be formed in a differ-
ent way as long as the manner is sufficient to show agreement through
mutual assent.36
C. Clickwrap
Clickwrap agreements are a type of adhesion contract.37 Clickwrap
agreements are created online and present “the potential [user] . . . with a
message on his or her computer screen, requiring that the user manifest
his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement . . . .”38
The user manifests consent by clicking on a box containing “I
Agree,” “I Accept,” or similar language manifesting consent adjacent to
the terms.39 This process forces potential users to acknowledge the pres-
ence of the terms, even if the terms are not read by the user.  Further, the
user must “unambiguously manifest either assent or rejection prior to
being given access to the product.”40 If the user refuses to accept the
terms, the user will not be permitted to use the service or obtain the good
at the center of the exchange.
Commentators have found “nothing inherently troubling about en-
forcing clickwrap agreements.”41  Courts have agreed and thus found
that users have reasonable notice of terms within clickwrap agreements
and have upheld the provisions within the terms of service presented
through clickwrap.42  When determining whether specific provisions in
34 See id.
35 See id. at 1453.
36 See id. at 1452. See also Kim, supra note 23, at 38 (explaining that the Court in
ProCD found that UCC 2-204(1) permits a contract to formed in a “different way” as long as
there is mutual recognition of the contract’s existence).
37 See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 577, 577–78 (2007).
38 Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39 See  KIM, supra note 23, at 39.
40 Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 429.
41 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Mark A.
Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006)); see also Davis, supra note 34, at
579 (noting that courts have recognized that clicking “I Agree” on a clickwrap contract
manifests assent).  For cases that have upheld the terms of clickwrap agreements, see for ex-
ample ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d 1447; Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC 97–0331, 1998 WL
307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998).
42 See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
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clickwrap agreements should be upheld and whether reasonable notice of
the terms was given, courts apply traditional principles of contract law.43
Courts assess whether the “clickwrap agreement’s terms were clearly
presented to the consumer, the consumer had an opportunity to read the
agreement, and the consumer manifested an unambiguous acceptance of
the terms.”44
D. Browsewrap
Browsewrap is another form of an online standard form agreement.
“[A] browse wrap license is part of a web site” that explains the terms of
service and privacy policy of that website.45  For example, in many
browsewrap licenses, “terms are posted on a site’s home page or are
accessible by a prominently displayed hyperlink, and the user assents to
the contract when the user visits the web site.”46  Typically, in brow-
sewrap and unlike clickwrap, the user does not “see the contract at all
but . . . the license terms provide that using a Web site constitutes agree-
ment to a contract whether the user knows it or not.”47  The most com-
monly found browsewrap form involves a disclaimer on the website that
states that by visiting the site, conduct that was previously performed by
the user, the user agrees to the terms of the website.48  The terms of the
website are available by clicking on a separate hyperlink.49 Commonly,
the hyperlink will be at the edge of a page, using words such as “Legal
Terms,” “Terms of Use,” or “Conditions of Use.”50  Thus, unlike click-
wrap, browsewrap does not require a user to affirmatively manifest con-
sent to the terms of service by clicking on “I Accept” or other similar
language.51 Rather, the user’s assent occurs through the continued use of
the site beyond the home page.52
Many courts have been reluctant to enforce provisions found within
browsewrap agreements because of a lack of reasonable notice of the
agreement’s terms, both in cases where the browsewrap agreement was
43 Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
44 Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2012).
45 Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 429 (alterations in the original) (quoting Pollstar v.
Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46 Id. (quoting Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981) (internal bracket omitted).
47 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Lemley,
supra note 41, at 460).
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See KIM, supra note 23, at 41.
51 See id.
52 See Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users
Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 406 (2010); see also KIM, supra note 23,
at 41.
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between consumers and a business,53 and between two sophisticated bus-
iness parties.54 But some courts have upheld browsewrap agreements be-
tween two sophisticated business parties who were in competition or
conflict with each other.55
III. PREVIOUS PRIVACY MISSTEPS OF FACEBOOK
Facebook has consistently pushed the envelope on its users’ right of
privacy.  Below are several incidents that raised legal issues concerning
Facebook’s possible infringement of the right of privacy of its users.
A. A User’s Voluntary Deletion of the User’s Facebook Account
For many years after the inception of Facebook, it was not possible
for users to delete their accounts.  Rather, the only option was to deacti-
vate the account.56 But even when a user deactivated an account, the
“[r]emoved information may persist in backup copies for a reasonable
amount of time but will not be generally available to members of
Facebook.”57 If a Facebook user deactivated an account, the information
may not have been generally available to Facebook members, but no
term prohibited Facebook from distributing the information to advertis-
ers.58 Instead, third-party applications and websites could hold on to the
53 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (declining
to apply terms of a browsewrap contract in a putative class action by several individuals).
54 See, e.g., Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
55 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); Sw. Airlines
Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007). See also Lemley, supra note 41, at 472 (“An examination of the
cases that have considered browsewraps in the last five years [prior to 2006] demonstrates that
the courts have been willing to enforce terms of use against corporations, but have not been
willing to do so against individuals.”).
56 See Bob Sullivan, Didn’t you know? Facebook is forever, THE RED TAPE CHRONICLES
ON NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 20, 2009, 8:00 AM) http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2009/02/20/
6345783-didnt-you-know-facebook-is-forever?lite.
57 See Bob Sullivan, Didn’t you know? Facebook is forever, THE RED TAPE CHRONICLES
ON NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 20, 2009, 8:00 AM) http://redtape.nbcnews.com/_news/2009/02/20/
6345783-didnt-you-know-facebook-is-forever?lite. (emphasis added).
58 The relevant terms of service at the time were as follows:
“You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transfer-
able, fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to (a) use, copy,
publish, stream, store, retain, publicly perform or display, transmit, scan, reformat,
modify, edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create derivative works and distribute
(through multiple tiers), any User Content you (i) Post on or in connection with the
Facebook Service or the promotion thereof subject only to your privacy settings or
(ii) enable a user to Post, including by offering a Share Link on your website and (b)
to use your name, likeness and image for any purpose, including commercial or
advertising, each of (a) and (b) on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the
promotion thereof.
You may remove your User Content from the Site at any time. If you choose to
remove your User Content, the license granted above will automatically expire, how-
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information to the extent permitted by Facebook’s policies.59  Further,
there was no way for a user to permanently delete an account so that the
information was destroyed and unavailable to advertisers and third-party
websites.  Rather, the content could only be removed by manually delet-
ing every picture, every friend, and every item posted by the user on
Facebook.60
In response to the gradual uproar over the inability of users to delete
their accounts, Facebook added a link to their website permitting users to
delete their accounts.61  When the link was originally created, a bug in
the process permitted the deleted accounts to still be found through
Google searches,62 and Content URLs.63 Once the link was fixed, the
delay between the request for an account deletion and the actual deletion
became fourteen days.64 Even after a user deletes an account, some infor-
mation, such as communications sent to other users, cannot be removed
from Facebook and could remain eternally much like a sent email.65
B. Beacon Online Advertising System
In November of 2007, Facebook introduced Beacon, an online ad-
vertising system for its website.66  The Beacon system tracked the online
ever you acknowledge that the Company may retain archived copies of your User
Content.
. . .
The following sections will survive any termination of your use of the
Facebook Service: Prohibited Conduct, User Content, Your Privacy Practices, Gift
Credits, Ownership; Proprietary Rights, Licenses, Submissions, User Disputes;
Complaints, Indemnity, General Disclaimers, Limitation on Liability, Termination
and Changes to the Facebook Service, Arbitration, Governing Law; Venue and Juris-
diction and Other.”
C. Walters, Facebook’s New Terms of Service: ‘We Can Do Anything We Want with Your
Content. Forever.’ THE CONSUMERIST (February 15, 2009), http://consumerist.com/2009/02/
15/facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-want-with-your-content-forever.
59 Ki Mae Heussner, Quitting Facebook: What Happens when You Deactivate?, ABC
NEWS: TECH THIS OUT (May 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/quitting-facebook-
deactivate/story?id=10607753&page=2.  The information included in the data Facebook may
keep includes credit card information for any purchases transacted on Facebook, email ad-
dresses, and phone numbers given by its members. Id.
60 See Sullivan, supra note 56; see also Steven Mansour, 2504 Steps to Closing Your
Facebook Account, STEVENMANSOUR.COM, (July 23, 2007), http://www.stevenmansour.com/
writings/2007/jul/23/2342/2504_steps_to_closing_your_facebook_account (depicting one
user’s informal account of the process required to manually delete his Facebook profile).
61 See Sullivan, supra note 56.
62 See id.
63 Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184, 2011 WL 7096348, at ¶¶ 50-53 at *11 (F.T.C. Nov. 29,
2011).
64 Heussner, supra note 59.
65 Id.; see also What’s the difference between deactivation and deleting my account?,
FACEBOOK (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:00 PM), https://www.facebook.com/help/125338004213029.
66 See Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook’s Beacon More Intrusive than Previously Thought,
PCWORLD (Nov. 30, 2007 4:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/140182/article.html.
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activities of Facebook users on more than forty participating websites.67
Beacon would then report the activity of the user on the participating
companies’ websites to the user’s friends list on Facebook.68 Facebook
automatically placed all of its users into the program, although a user
could opt out of Beacon through express action.69  If a user did not opt
out, when the user purchased an item from one of the participating web-
sites, the purchase would automatically be broadcast to the entire list of
friends on the user’s profile when logging on to Facebook’s website.70
The issue with Beacon occurred when a security researcher deter-
mined that Beacon went further than stated by Facebook.71 If Facebook
users opted out of Beacon, thus declining to have their activities broad-
cast to Facebook friends, and then logged off of Facebook’s website,
Beacon would nevertheless continue to function.72 Beacon would report
users’ activity to Facebook, despite the fact that users were not informed
about this feature.73
Moreover, Facebook did not give users the option of preventing
Beacon from tracking them.74  The controversy led to Mark Zuckerberg,
founder of Facebook, apologizing in his blog for the Beacon program’s
tracking.75
The apology did little to quell the uproar caused by the infringement
on Facebook users’ right to privacy.  In response to the violation, plain-
tiffs filed a class action lawsuit in California.76 The lawsuit claimed that
Facebook violated its users’ privacy by collecting private data for use in
67 Id. The participating websites included large corporations such as Blockbuster, The
New York Times, Sony Pictures and others. C. Walters, List of Companies that Participate in
Facebook’s Beacon Spy Program, THE CONSUMERIST (Dec. 4, 2007), http://consumerist.com/
2007/12/04/list-of-companies-that-participate-in-facebooks-beacon-spy-program.
68 Perez, supra note 66.
69 Jessica Guynn, Latest Target of MoveOn: Facebook, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 21,
2007, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/21/business/fi-facebook21.
70 See Perez, supra note 66.  Facebook defended the Beacon program by arguing that the
program would create a pop-up box telling the user that the information would be sent to
Facebook.  Guynn, supra note 69.  The user could click “No Thanks.” Id.  If the user did not
click “No Thanks,” the next time the user visited Facebook, a message would ask for permis-
sion to share the information with the user’s friends. Id.
71 See Perez, supra note 66.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See Mark Zuckerberg, Thoughts on Beacon, FACEBOOK BLOG (Dec. 5. 2007, 10:00
AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=7584397130. See also C. G. Lynch, Wake-Up
Call in Facebook-Beacon Controversy, PCWORLD (Dec. 6, 2007 3:45 PM), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/140372/article.html.
76 See Vasanth Sridharan, Facebook Faces Class Action Suit Over Beacon Ad System,
BUS. INSIDER, (Aug. 14, 2008, 11:48 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/8/facebook-
faces-class-action-suit-over-beacon-ad-system.
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advertising without informing or seeking permission from its users,77
thus violating online privacy and computer fraud laws.78
The lawsuit and uproar continued until Facebook shuttered the Bea-
con program as part of a proposed settlement to the 2009 class action
lawsuit.79  Though the case was settled, Facebook denied every accusa-
tion in the claim.80  Several years later, Zuckerberg admitted that Beacon
was a “high profile” mistake.81
C. February 2009 Change in Terms of Service
On February 6, 2009, Facebook changed its terms of service by
eliminating several lines of text.82  Prior to the change of the terms of
service, Facebook’s terms stated that when a user closed an account on
Facebook, all rights Facebook claimed to original content uploaded by
the user expired.83  The altered terms permitted Facebook to utilize
uploaded content for perpetuity, permitted Facebook to sublicense a
user’s content without paying royalties, and permitted Facebook to use a
user’s name, likeness and image for any purpose.84  But termination of a
77 See Perez, supra note 66; Sridharan supra note 76.
78 See Anastasia Ustinova, Suit Says Facebook Ad Program Invaded Privacy, SFGATE
(Aug. 15, 2008, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Suit-says-Facebook-ad-pro-
gram-invaded-privacy-3273100.php.  Along with Facebook, many companies that participated
in the Beacon program were also named as defendants in the suit. Id.
79 See Cecilia Kang, Facebook Shuts Beacon Advertising Program that Shares Info on
Online Shopping, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2009 10:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
posttech/2009/12/facebook_shuts_beacon_adverist.html. See also Jon Brodkin, Facebook
Halts Beacon, Gives $9.5M to Settle Lawsuit, PCWORLD (Dec. 8, 2009, 1:39 PM), http://www.
pcworld.com/article/184029/facebook_halts_beacon_gives_9_5_million_to_settle_lawsuit.
html.  Facebook also set up a $9.5 million dollar fund for a non-profit foundation that will
support online safety and privacy. See id.  The lawsuit settlement was appealed to the United
States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit and upheld. See Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d
811, 812 (9th Cir. 2012).
80 See Kang, supra note 79.
81 Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, FACEBOOK BLOG
(Nov. 29, 2011, 9:39 AM), https://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131.
The eliminated lines of the terms of service are as follows: “You may remove your User
Content from the Site at any time.  If you choose to remove your User Content, the License
granted above will automatically expire, however you acknowledge that the Company may
retain archived copies of your User Content.”  Walters, supra note 58.
82 See Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Facebook Withdraws Changes in Data Use, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/technology/internet/
19facebook.html?_r=0.
83 See Walters, supra note 58.
84 See Walters, supra note 58.  The new terms of service stated the following:
“You hereby grant Facebook an irrevocable, perpetual, non-exclusive, transferable
fully paid, worldwide license (with the right to sublicense) to (a) use, copy, publish,
stream, store, retain, publicly perform or display, transmit, scan, reformat, modify,
edit, frame, translate, excerpt, adapt, create derivative works and distribute (through
multiple tiers), any User Content you (i) Post on or in connection with the Facebook
Service or the promotion thereof subject only to your privacy settings or (ii) enable a
user to Post, including by offering a Share Link on your website and (b) to use your
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user’s account would no longer terminate Facebook’s right to the user’s
content.85
Facebook’s right to a user’s data would continue even if a Facebook
user removed all of the user’s photographs, deleted each of the user’s
friends from the user’s Facebook page, and canceled the user’s ac-
count.86  This change originally came with little publicity until The Con-
sumerist, a blog owned by a subsidiary of Consumer Reports, brought
the altered terms of service to light on February 15.87
In response to public attention to the changes in Facebook’s terms,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center and other groups planned to
file a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleging un-
fair and deceptive trade practices.88  The claim was grounded on
Facebook’s repeated promises to users that users owned the content they
shared.89  The organization claimed that the altered terms of service were
intended to give advertisers access to content contributed by users, and
that the content sometimes revealed private details about a user’s life.90
In order to stave off the planned complaint with the FTC, Facebook
retreated from the change of terms of service.91  In order to placate
Facebook users, Facebook invited all users to help contribute to a new
Bill of Rights and Responsibilities for the company.92  Despite
Facebook’s appeasement of Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
FTC filed a complaint against Facebook over the issues.93
D. Facebook Privacy Issues in 2010
On May 5, 2010, Facebook users discovered a glitch that permitted
access to the private information of their Facebook friends.94  Although
this glitch was temporary, the privacy breach “heightened a feeling
name, likeness, and image for any purpose, including commercial or advertising,
each of (a) and (b) on or in connection with the Facebook Service or the promotion
thereof.”
Id.
85 See Walters, supra note 58.
86 See Sullivan, supra note 56.
87 See Walters, supra note 58.
88 See Stone & Stelter, supra note 82.
89 See id.
90 See id.; Walters, supra note 55.
91 See Stone & Stelter, supra note 82.
92 See id.
93 See Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184, 2011 WL 7096348, at *1 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011).
In its complaint, the FTC included a charge that Facebook materially changed promises to
keep information private. See id. ¶¶ 19-29 at *4–6.
94 See Jenna Wortham, Facebook and Privacy Clash Again, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/technology/internet/06facebook.html.
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among many users that it was becoming hard to trust the service to pro-
tect their personal information.”95
The privacy issues continued with a change in the design of
Facebook profiles.  Facebook began causing some previously private in-
formation of its users to become public because of the way the informa-
tion was linked to the user’s profile.96  This change caused the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC)97 to file a complaint with the FTC.98
Unlike the planned complaint in 2009, Facebook did not strike a deal
with EPIC to prevent the FTC filing.99 In response to the filed complaint
the FTC and Facebook proposed a settlement barring Facebook from
making future changes to users’ privacy settings without their affirmative
consent, as well as requiring Facebook to implement a comprehensive
privacy protection program and submit to independent privacy audits for
twenty years.100 The terms of the settlement were finalized in August of
2012.101
E. Find Friends Nearby Feature
In June of 2012, Facebook created a “Find Friends Nearby” fea-
ture.102 This permitted Facebook users to locate their friends nearby us-
ing the GPS feature prevalent on mobile phones.103 The feature was
intended to permit a Facebook user to “quickly look up and ‘friend’
someone” who the user had met in person.104  Rather than receiving ac-
colades Facebook experienced a backlash from its users, some labeling
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 The Electronic Privacy Information Center is a public interest research center located
in Washington, DC established “to focus public attention on emerging civil liberties issues and
to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and constitutional values.” About EPIC, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/epic/about.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
98 See Wortham, supra note 94, at B1.
99 See supra Part III.C.
100 See Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011) (agreement containing con-
sent order), http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/111129facebookagree.pdf; see also In re
Facebook, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook
(last visited July 12, 2013).
101 See News Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Approves Final Settlement with
Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/facebook.shtm.
102 See Joanna Stern, Facebook ‘Find Friends Nearby’  Lets You Find New Friends
Around You, ABC NEWS, (June 25, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technol-
ogy/2012/06/facebook-find-friends-nearby-lets-you-find-new-friends-around-you.  Facebook
released a statement after the feature was available stating the feature was not a full release,
but rather a test. See id.
103 See id.
104 John D. Sutter, Facebook Pulls Location-Tracking Feature, CNN (June 26, 2012, 6:12
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/26/tech/social-media/facebook-pulls-find-friends-nearby/
index.html.
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the feature a “stalking app,”105 causing Facebook to eliminate the
feature.106
IV. FACEBOOK’S CURRENT TERMS OF SERVICE, PRIVACY POLICY
TERMS, AND NEW USER SIGN-UP PROCESS
A. The Current Sign-Up Process for Facebook
To join Facebook a new user must go to Facebook’s home page to
sign up.107 The new user is required to input a first and last name, give an
email address, select a password, enter a birthday, select the user’s gen-
der, and then click “Sign Up.”108  On that same page, in a font size
smaller than the rest of the sign-up materials, is the following: “By click-
ing Sign Up, you agree to our Terms, and that you have read our Data
Use Policy, including our Cookie Use.”109 The words “Terms,” “Data
Use Policy,” and “Cookie Use” are hyperlinked so that clicking on each
link brings a new user to the appropriate policy.110 Upon filling in the
required information and clicking the “Sign Up” button, the new user is
transported to the “Getting Started” page of Facebook and is free to con-
tinue to the site without performing other required conduct.111
B. Facebook’s Previous User Sign-Up Process: Fteja v. Facebook,
Inc.112
In Fteja, the Southern District of New York upheld Facebook’s pre-
vious sign-up process as giving reasonable notice to potential users of its
forum selection clause.113 However, the previous sign-up process is dif-
ferent from the current process.  Thus, new analysis is needed to deter-
mine whether Facbook gives reasonable notice to its users with its new
sign-up process.  Further, the right to privacy should receive greater pro-
tection than a forum selection clause, which determines where a user
may file a claim against Facebook.  Being forced to litigate in California
is an annoyance and sacrifice that many may be willing to take on for a
105 Id., see also Dave Copeland, How to Use Facebook’s Newest Stalking App, READ-
WRITEWEB (June 25, 2012), http://readwrite.com/2012/06/25/how-to-use-facebooks-newest-
stalking-app.
106 See Stacy Curtin, ‘It Is Not Our Intention to Sell Your Photos’: Instagram Co-
Founder, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100327905/039It_Is_
Not_Our_Intention_to_Sell_Your_Photos039_Instagram_CoFounder.
107 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
113 See id. at 841.  This case pertained to a forum selection clause within the terms of
service causing all litigation involving Facebook to occur in a federal court located in Santa
Clara County, California. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-3\CJP305.txt unknown Seq: 16  9-MAY-14 11:58
676 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:661
less expensive product.  However, unknowingly sacrificing privacy
rights for the “free” use of a social media website is a serious violation of
rights that requires more disclosure.
In Fteja, the sign-up process at the time consisted of clicking a box
that said “Sign Up” on two distinct pages.114  On the first page, the po-
tential user was required to fill out personal and contact information.115
Once the potential user clicked on the box labeled “Sign Up,” the user
was taken to a second page titled “Security Check.”116  On this page, the
user was required to enter a series of characters displayed on the page,
and once again click on the “Sign Up” button.117  Immediately below
that button appeared the following text: “By clicking Sign Up, you are
indicating that you have read and agree to the Terms of Service.”118
“Terms of Service” was underlined, indicating the text was a hyperlink
that could be clicked on to bring the user to Facebook’s terms of
service.119
The court, relying partly on Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,120
found that the user assented to Facebook’s forum selection clause during
the sign-up process because a hyperlinked “Terms of Use” phrase is
equivalent to a sign that states “Click Here for Terms of Use.”121  Once
the users assented to the terms, the court looked at the public policy
ramifications of the forum selection clause that required all litigation to
occur in the Northern District of California.122  Because both the wit-
nesses and Facebook employees, in addition to the relevant documents in
the case, were located in the Northern District of California, the court
found litigation there would be “more logical, convenient, and just.”123
Thus, potential plaintiffs would be forced to litigate in California, the
location where many if not all of the witnesses and evidence required for
the trial would be located.
While the Fteja court’s analysis may seem sound at first glance, and
thus applicable to the current Facebook sign-up process and terms of
service, there are several weaknesses.  First, in the cases cited by the
114 See id. at 834.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 835.
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 499 U.S. 585 (1991).  In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Supreme Court upheld a forum
selection clause in fine print on the back of a cruise ticket, even though purchasers did not
receive the ticket until some time after purchase.  Thus, the purchasers were bound by the
terms even though they did not receive notice of them until after the purchase.  See id.
121 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
122 See id.
123 Id. at 844. The court also found that Fteja had not pointed to “any significant connec-
tion between his action and [the Southern District of New York]” where Fteja had filed his
claim.
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court in Fteja, the user of the vendor’s services each purchased an ex-
press use of the service.  In Carnival Cruise Lines, the plaintiffs had
“purchased passage for a 7-day cruise on petitioner’s ship, the Tropi-
cale.”124  The purchasers paid a fare directly and expressly to a travel
agent for the purpose of exchanging the payment for a cruise, and the
travel agent in turn paid the defendant cruise ship company.125  In Effron
v. Sun Line Cruises, Inc.,126  the plaintiffs had “purchased a 17-day
South American vacation package through her Florida based travel
agent,” And making an express payment in exchange for a vacation.127
In both Carnival Cruise Lines and Effron, the plaintiffs were held to have
had reasonable notice of unseen terms after purchasing and paying for
the right to use a service.
Unlike in the above cases, a Facebook user does not pay a monetary
fee to utilize the services of Facebook’s social media website.128  Rather,
the user pays an implicit price during sign up by permitting Facebook to
gather information on the user, including the user’s name, age, birthday,
gender, and any photos posted.129  In many cases, a reasonable user
would not be aware of the price users implicitly pay upon completing
Facebook’s sign-up process.  Thus, unlike in Carnival Cruise Lines and
Effron, there is no express payment from the purchaser to the vendor that
would place a reasonable person on notice that the vendor may have
terms of service.130  While one expects contract terms to be present when
purchasing a good or service, such as a return policy or conditions of use
of the service, it is less apparent, possibly even concealed from a reason-
able person’s knowledge, that Facebook will encroach upon a user’s
right to privacy when the individual user makes no express purchase.
Further, the Court in Fteja analogizes the Facebook sign-up process
to a simple roadside fruit stand.131  The court states:
The situation might be compared to one in which
Facebook ‘maintains a roadside fruit stand displaying
bins of apples.’  For purposes of this case, suppose that
above the bins of apples are signs that say, ‘By picking
124 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587.
125 See id.
126 67 F.3d 7 (2d Cir.1995).
127 Id.
128 See David Goldman, You’re Only Worth $1.21 to Facebook, CNN MONEY, (May 16,
2012) http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/16/technology/facebook-arpu/index.htm (“Facebook cus-
tomers don’t pay the social network directly—they upload personal information, which
Facebook uses to attract advertisers.”).
129 See Facebook’s Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/pri-
vacy/your-info (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
130 Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
131 Id.  The court in Fteja adopts the analogy from a previous court of appeals case from
the Second Circuit: Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004).
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up this apple, you consent to the terms of sales by this
fruit stand.  For those terms, turn over this sign.’132
Just as in the cases cited by the court, the fault in the reasoning lies
in the analogy. With a fruit stand, a purchase of an apple will lead a
reasonable person to believe there is some type of return policy.  For
example, if a customer bought a rotten apple infested with worms, the
customer would believe that a return or exchange would be permitted.
Thus, a reasonable person would believe that additional terms existed
besides the exchange of an apple for money.  The exchange of currency
for the product dictates that terms such as a return policy exist.  Thus, if
something goes wrong, it is possible for the customer to be restored to
their previous position.
But with Facebook, the situation is significantly different.  A rea-
sonable person may not expect terms to exist when signing up for a
“free” website, especially when never expressly agreeing to terms by
clicking on “I Agree” or similar language.  When a user signs up, they
are not expecting a return policy to be hidden somewhere on the website
because in the user’s mind, no purchase has occurred that would require
a return of a purchase price.  Thus, they do not expect worms in the
product that would require a return or exchange because no money has
changed hands.  But Facebook’s collection and distribution in to adver-
tisers of the user’s demographics and other private information is the
price paid by the user.  The information Facebook obtains leads to a large
part of Facebook’s revenue.133  This price is paid implicitly instead of
explicitly as in the cases cited by the court or the fruit stand analogy.
While the individual who pays for a product gets less protection concern-
ing contract formation, the actual exchange of cash makes it clear that an
agreement is occurring.
Further, once a user’s information is disseminated to Facebook,
there can be no return of the implicit purchase price.  If the user finds
“worms” inside Facebook, the user can never be placed in the same posi-
tion as immediately after the exchange because Facebook commoditized
the user’s information by selling it to advertisers.134  The user sold a
132 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (citations omitted).
133 Goldman, supra note 128.  The average revenue per user is $1.21 per quarter, or $4.84
per year.  See id.
134 The use of user’s private information has led to lawsuits.  For example, a recent class
action lawsuit involving Facebook involved the use of Sponsored Stories.  Fraley v. Facebook,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).  If a user clicked on the like button of a brand or
corporation, the user’s friends could start seeing the corporation’s advertisements with the
user’s name and photograph.  Laurie Segal, Facebook Could Pay Users in Class-Action Spon-
sored Stories Settlement, CNN MONEY, (Jan. 28, 2013) http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/28/
technology/social/facebook-class-action/index.html.  In response to suit, Facebook offered a
settlement which included changing its terms of services to “more clearly explain how Spon-
sored Stories” work. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-3\CJP305.txt unknown Seq: 19  9-MAY-14 11:58
2014] FACEBOOK, PRIVACY, AND REASONABLE NOTICE 679
commodity, the user’s privacy and information, to Facebook in exchange
for use of the website.  While a user may be able to cancel the Facebook
account, it is impossible to retrieve information that has likely already
been disseminated and used by Facebook to attract advertisers and third-
party applications.  This is unlike purchasing a piece of fruit from a fruit
stand.  If a user of the fruit stand bites into an apple to find it is rotten to
the core, the apple may be returned for a refund and the parties brought
back to the same position as before they had contracted.  If a Facebook
user signs up to the website only to find that the product is rotten to the
core, the user cannot get back the private information sold by Facebook
and possibly used by advertisers.  The substantive right of privacy is dis-
tinct from the right to choose a forum to litigate claims and must be
treated as such in an analysis concerning whether reasonable notice was
given.
C. Facebook’s Current Sign-Up Process, Reasonable Notice, and
Mutual Assent
1. Reasonable Notice of Terms of Service Permitting Facebook
to Gather and Distribute a User’s Private Information
In contracting, whether in the real world or online, manifestation of
assent is an integral part of the process, for without assent determined
objectively, there can be no contract.135 Contracting on the Internet is
different from real-world contracting.  “Reasonably conspicuous notice
of the existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of as-
sent to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is
to have integrity and credibility.”136  When a clickwrap agreement is
scrutinized, “[c]ourts evaluate whether a clickwrap agreement’s terms
were clearly presented to the consumer, the consumer had an opportunity
to read the agreement, and the consumer manifested an unambiguous
acceptance of the terms.”  It is because of this rationale and analysis of
the above factors that courts consistently uphold clickwrap agreements
where a user must scroll through the terms and click a box with the
words “I Agree” or other similar language within the box.  On the other
hand, courts often find a lack of reasonable notice of terms within brow-
sewrap agreements where the terms are located on a separate page and
the user need not click on a box that states “I Agree” or other similar
language.137
135 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002); Koch In-
dus., Inc. v. Does, 2:10CV1275DAK, 2011 WL 1775765 (D. Utah May 9, 2011). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).
136 Specht, 306 F.3d at 35.
137 See supra Part II.
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Facebook’s current sign-up process is more like browsewrap than
clickwrap.  When a user signs up for Facebook, the user is not required
to scroll through a list of terms, as would a user in a clickwrap agree-
ment.  Such a user may not expect additional terms when signing up for
what the user believes to be a free service.  This is especially true when
the additional terms help weaken a right that is held to be sacred through
public policy.
But Facebook’s sign-up process is not typical browsewrap either.
In a typical browsewrap agreement, a user must scroll to the bottom of
the screen in order to find a link to the terms of service of the website.
Here, Facebook has the links directly on the page above the box labeled
“Sign Up” where it states, “By clicking Sign Up, you agree to our Terms
and that you have read our Data Policy, including our Cookie Use.”  The
words “Terms,” “Data Policy,” and “Cookie Use” are all links to the
terms of use of the site.  This statement above “Sign Up” is in size 8.5
font, whereas the boxes required to be filled out during the registration
process and the “Sign Up” button are larger than the linked terms.
Reasonable notice is not given to Facebook users regarding the in-
formation contained within Facebook’s Terms of Service.  A user is not
required to click on a box that says “I Agree.”  Rather, the user must
click on “Sign Up.”  The statement which informs the user of the agree-
ment is smaller and in a different font color than the rest of the page.
While this procedure gives some notice, it is not reasonable notice for
giving up privacy rights because of the importance of the substantive
right of privacy.
2. The Substantive Right of Privacy is Distinct from the Right
to Choose a Forum for Litigating Claims
Although the court in Fteja v. Facebook138 upheld on reasonable
notice grounds a similar previous sign-up process for Facebook that also
did not fit neatly into a pure clickwrap or browsewrap category, the is-
sues are distinct.  A forum selection clause does not eliminate a user’s
constitutional right to a trial by jury.  While the right to a trial by jury for
civil cases is a legally protected constitutional right,139 a forum selection
clause does not destroy the right, but rather focuses the location of the
trial in a specific court.  This may inconvenience a plaintiff, but it does
not destroy the right to trial by jury.
In Fteja, the forum selection clause did not limit the filing of claims
to a jurisdiction that would be unsympathetic to the claim.  Instead, the
court found that the locus of operative facts would appear to be in the
138 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
139 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Northern District of California, the jurisdiction in which Facebook’s fo-
rum selection clause declared litigation would occur.140  The action
against Facebook in Fteja was for breach of contract.  In a breach of
contract case, the locus of operative facts looks at “where the contract
was negotiated or executed, where it was to be performed, and where the
alleged breach occurred.”141 In a claim of contract breach against
Facebook, although Facebook’s social media website was meant to be
utilized and available anywhere in the world,142  Facebook’s terms of
service were drafted and executed by Facebook in Palo Alto, which is
located in the Northern District of California.143  Lastly, any breach by
Facebook would likely occur in its Palo Alto headquarters location where
the corporation resides.144  Thus, a reasonable person could expect terms
to be present that permit the company to be sued in a location that is
convenient for evidence purposes and minimizes other transaction
costs.145
Privacy is unlike a forum selection clause in several ways.  First, the
privacy rights given up by a Facebook user upon completion of the
Facebook sign-up process destroy those rights completely.  Unlike a fo-
rum selection clause, Facebook can and does sell the user’s private infor-
mation for a profit.  Facebook cannot sell its forum selection clause and
sell the right to force litigation into the Northern District of California to
another company or individual.  A Facebook user is still free to file a
claim against others who may commit a contract breach or tort in a juris-
diction of the user’s choosing.146  But once Facebook obtains a user’s
privacy rights, the rights become a commodity that can be sold and trans-
ferred to advertisers and others for a price.
Because of its terms permitting Facebook to aggregate collected pri-
vate user information with other data, such as public records and credit
scores, the data compiled by Facebook creates a profile of a person
“more accurate, and more detailed than any file ever compiled by J. Ed-
gar Hoover.”147  “It is possible that [the user] can be known better by
these data aggregators than by [the user’s] own friends and kin.”148  If
Facebook sells the data to a third party, the data could be used for com-
140 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
141 Id.; see also Reinhard v. Dow Chem. Co., 07 Civ. 3641(RPP), 2007 WL 2324351
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2007).
142 See id.
143 Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
144 See id.
145 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593 (1991); Effron v.
Sun Line Cruises, Inc., 67 F.3d 7, 8 (2d Cir. 1995).
146 Assuming all jurisdictional rules are properly met.
147 Richard J. Yurko, Don’t Click This Article!, BOSTON BAR J., Fall 2012, http://boston
barjournal.com/2012/09/12/dont-click-this-article.
148 Id.
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mercial, political, or possibly even nefarious ends, depending on the final
resting point of the information.149  The reasonable expectation of a
Facebook user does not contemplate the possibility that the data could be
used by anyone willing to purchase the information.150
3. Termination or Completion of the Agreement
The termination or completion of a contract by either party has dif-
ferent consequences depending on whether the clause unknown to the
user is a forum selection clause or a “sale” of privacy rights.  Once the
parties complete performance of a contract, a forum selection clause
ceases to exist.  Because the user does not need to have any further con-
tact with the other party, the forum selection clause is rendered moot.
But the privacy right sold has different consequences on contract com-
pletion.  When a user cancels his Facebook account, ending the agree-
ment between the user and Facebook, the “sale” of the user’s privacy
rights will have already occurred.  By that point, Facebook, and possibly
third-party Facebook applications, will have already collected and aggre-
gated the user’s data.  The end of the contract terminates Facebook’s
rights to the continued collection of a user’s data.151  But it leaves the
previous data collected at the mercy of Facebook and others who
Facebook may have permitted to collect data.152  Facebook could con-
tinue to sell the user’s personal data, data which the user almost certainly
believes will become private once the user deletes his account.  Because
this data can be bought by anyone with the ability to pay, it is impossible
to determine how or for what purpose the data already purchased has
been used or how it will continue to be used.  Unlike a forum selection
clause which ends when the contract is complete, the “sale” of one’s
privacy rights, and the consequences of that sale, cannot be undone.
149 Id.  The possibility of the use of this data in myriad ways has not escaped the notice of
the Federal Trade Commissioner. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS (March 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyre-
port.pdf.
150 See Yurko, supra note 147.
151 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Nov. 3, 2013, 6:19 PM),
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms  (“This IP License ends when you delete your IP content
or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have not deleted
it.”). But see Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, (Nov. 3, 2013, 6:19 PM), https://www.facebook.
com/full_data_use_policy#deleting  [hereinafter Data Use Policy] (“When you delete an ac-
count, it is permanently deleted from Facebook. It typically takes about one month to delete an
account, but some information may remain in backup copies and logs for up to 90
days. . . . Certain information is needed to provide you with services, so we only delete this
information after you delete your account. Some of the things you do on Facebook aren’t
stored in your account, like posting to a group or sending someone a message . . . . That
information remains after you delete your account.”).
152 See Data Use Policy, supra note 151.
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There is a further difference between the types of clauses in the
decision to create a public record after the termination of the contract.
The filing of a lawsuit is a public matter.  A user can take into account
the forum selection clause when determining whether or not it would be
a prudent move to go forward with a lawsuit, given the circumstances of
the user’s situation, and, consequently, to create a public record on the
matter.  One who files a claim creates a record that is “presumed to be
open to the public.”153  Records of filed claims are often available online
and searchable by party name.154  Filing a lawsuit is a conscious action,
and the filer can view the consequences of such conduct with foresight.
The decision to file a lawsuit is something that an individual will typi-
cally contemplate and seek guidance and counsel on before choosing the
proper course of action.  An individual may choose whether or not to
exercise this right.  In contrast, as discussed above, upon termination of a
user’s Facebook account, the extent third parties use the user’s data for
purposes that generate a searchable public record is impossible to deter-
mine.155  The Facebook user no longer has any choice in the matter.
4. The Lack of Reasonable Notice and Substantive Differences
Between a Forum Selection Clause and the “Selling” of a
User’s Privacy Rights Lead to Lack of Mutual Assent
The concept of forum selection is wholly distinct from the concept
of privacy.  The privacy rights invaded by Facebook are rights that many
may find to be powerful.  In everyday social situations, people meet vari-
ous other people in public while going about their daily activities.  The
meeting and introduction may be brief or last for a longer period of time.
The normal expectation is that these new acquaintances would not turn
the other person’s name and photos into commodities, or sell that infor-
mation to advertisers.  Although introductions may be made and photos
taken in public they are nevertheless private in the respect that they will
not normally be commoditized and sold.  Interacting with Facebook, on
the other hand, does not parallel these normal, everyday interactions.
Facebook introduces itself to the user by requiring the user to complete a
sign-up process that requires the user to give his or her real name, rather
than a pseudonym or screen name as many websites require.  Sign up
153 Paul Grabowicz, Civil Court Lawsuits: Introduction, UC BERKELEY GRADUATE
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM (Oct. 24, 2012), http://multimedia.journalism.berkeley.edu/tutorials/
civil-court-lawsuits.
154 For example, the Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles maintains a
public website where a visitor can “search by name for litigants in Civil, Small Claims, Family
Law, and Probate cases in the Los Angeles Superior Court via [its] secure web server.” Civil
Party Name Search, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, https://www.
lasuperiorcourt.org/onlineservices/civilIndex (last visited Feb. 15, 2014).
155 See Data Use Policy, supra note 151.
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then requests that the user post a photo.  Once this is complete, Facebook
owns the right to sell and distribute the user’s name and photo to adver-
tisers.  This transforms a brief encounter that would ordinarily fade into a
private memory into a public commodity that is sold for a profit to any
entity or person willing to pay.
A reasonable person expects their name and likeness, as unique and
inherent personal attributes, to remain their right and property.  This ex-
pectation is distinguishable from any expectation of a right to forum se-
lection in filing a lawsuit, which is not inherent in an individual, but
rather arises dependent on external conditions.  In order for a user to
assent to the sale of his or her right to privacy, clear and manifest notice
must be given.156  With Facebook’s current sign-up process, Facebook
turns around the assumption that a user owns his or her private informa-
tion and states that the user is selling it to the site in exchange for website
use, and does so without reasonable notice.  Facebook turns the “intro-
duction” between the user and the website into a marketable event, al-
though the user is excluded from enjoying any part of the economic gain
from sale of his name and photo.  This process takes information from
the user that is not inherently public and morphs it into a public record
that can be turned into a commodity distributed for a profit to any other
person or entity with the money.  This is unlike a forum selection clause,
which limits a right that is ever-present in the public domain.  Facebook
should carefully evaluate the contract formation process and ensure rea-
sonable notice is given to the user that an agreement is being formed and,
within that agreement, that the user is selling part of his or her right to
privacy.
V. REMEDYING FACEBOOK’S LACK OF REASONABLE NOTICE OF ITS
TERMS OF SERVICE EXTRACTING THE LOSS OF PRIVACY
RIGHTS FROM FACEBOOK USERS
Public policy protects the right to privacy, but it does not prevent
individuals from voluntarily and knowingly yielding the right.157  But for
a transaction to occur that involves the yielding of the right to privacy,
reasonable notice must be given to the party who will be giving up his or
156 See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2002) ( “[A]n
offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous
contractual provisions of which he is unaware, contained in a document whose contractual
nature is not obvious.” ). See also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[A] contract includes only the terms on which the parties have agreed.  One cannot
agree to hidden terms . . . .”). One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 648 F.3d
258, 268 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Notice of incorporated terms is reasonable
where, under the particular facts of the case, ‘[a] reasonably prudent person should have seen’
them.”).
157 See supra text accompanying note 42.
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her right to privacy.158  Facebook’s sign-up process is more akin to
browsewrap than clickwrap, and thus does not give reasonable notice to
Facebook users of the privacy rights “sold” by the user for the right to
use Facebook.
The notice provided for forum selection clauses that is considered
reasonable notice and adequate for gaining assent to litigation in a speci-
fied forum is inadequate in the case of privacy rights because of the di-
vergence of the importance of the distinct rights.  The selling of one’s
privacy leaves only a vestige of the right to privacy.  Setting litigation in
a forum that is convenient for one party, and is likely to also be the most
convenient jurisdiction, leaves more than a vestige of a right for the user
because the right given up cannot be sold to other entities.
While privacy is an important right, it is not inviolable.  Americans
give up privacy rights every day when they sign up for contests, sign up
for loyalty cards at supermarkets, and when they sign up for mailing lists.
In each of these instances, the person has reasonable notice of the surren-
dered rights because they are listed on the sign-up sheet, or the person
must scroll through the rights that are given up before clicking on “I
Accept.”159  This is especially important in an online agreement situa-
tion, where a typical user would require seventy-six work days each year
in order to read each website’s privacy policies visited by a user.160
Facebook hides the ball by forcing its users to click through several
screens, with links that are smaller and of a lighter color than the sur-
rounding text, to determine what privacy rights are given up.  Further,
Facebook does not force the potential user to click on “I Accept” so the
user manifests the acknowledgment of the additional terms.  Instead, to
create a Facebook account, the user clicks on “Sign Up.”  Thus,
Facebook does not give its user reasonable notice of the quid pro quo of
the exchange because “Sign Up” does not have the same effect as “I
Accept.”  Without reasonable notice, it is not possible for the user to
assent to the terms.
Facebook could rectify the lack of reasonableness and create mutual
assent by changing its sign up process.  Instead of clicking on “Sign Up,”
Facebook could force the user to click on “I Accept” or “I Agree” in
order to manifest that an agreement is occurring.  This would give clear
notice that an agreement was being formed and that the user was as-
158 See supra text accompanying note 42.
159 See supra text accompanying note 42.
160 Keith Wagstaff, You’ll Need 76 Work Days to Read All Your Privacy Policies Each
Year, TIME TECH (Mar. 6 2012) http://techland.time.com/2012/03/06/youd-need-76-work-
days-to-read-all-your-privacy-policies-each-year; see also Aleecia M. McDonald, Lorrie Faith
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 540 (2008), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/is/
files/2012/02/Cranor_Formatted_Final.pdf.
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senting to Facebook’s terms.  While many may understand that the sign-
up process in legally analogous to a written contract, the reasonable per-
son does not expect privacy rights to be “sold” for use by anyone willing
to purchase the information by the simple process currently required to
sign up for Facebook because privacy is an important right.161  Typically,
when a user signs up to a website by providing only an email address, the
reasonable person expects to receive promotional emails from the web-
site.  But with Facebook, more than promotional emails are sent to the
user. The user will also receive targeted advertisements based on the in-
formation obtained by Facebook, including the pages the user has liked
and the user’s relationship status.162  The user will also receive spam
email from companies, some legitimate companies as well as companies
that are intended to defraud.  The user will also receive target advertise-
ments based on their likes on Facebook.In the past, Facebook has even
offered to share users’ home addresses and cellphone numbers with third
parties.163  Some apps Facebook gives access to obtain even more data
from the user, which could lead to spam email, as well as collect infor-
mation on the user’s friends.164 Thus, to give reasonable notice that more
than just an email and name is being turned into a commodity, more is
needed so the reasonable person understands the user is “paying”
Facebook with privacy rights in exchange for the website’s use.  The
terms must be presented clearly to the user so the user knows some terms
exists and is given a chance to read the terms before manifesting assent.
In order to give reasonable notice, and thus manifest mutual assent
to Facebook’s terms of service, Facebook must change its sign-up pro-
cess from its current browsewrap-like contracting to be classic clickwrap.
The current sign-up process is not true browsewrap as the links for the
terms of the agreement are not set at the bottom or top of the page.  But
they are in small font and a light color near a box that says “Sign Up”
rather than “I Agree” or similar language.  Facebook’s terms are not
prominent for a potential user to see, much like traditional browsewrap.
Thus, although Facebook’s agreement process is not traditional brow-
161 For example, 66% of Americans do not want marketers to tailor advertisements to
their interests, in part because of privacy concerns. See Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject
Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It 24–26 (2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478214.
162 See Lori Andrews, Facebook is Using You, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2012, at SR7, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/opinion/sunday/facebook-is-using-you.html?page-
wanted=all&_r=0.
163 See Bianca Bosker, Facebook to Share Users’ Home Addresses, Phone Numbers with
External Sites, Huffington Post, (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/28/
facebook-home-addresses-phone-numbers_n_829459.html.
164 See Julia Angwin and Jeremy Singer-Vine, Selling You on Facebook, Wall St. J. (Apr.
7, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303302504577
327744009046230.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-3\CJP305.txt unknown Seq: 27  9-MAY-14 11:58
2014] FACEBOOK, PRIVACY, AND REASONABLE NOTICE 687
sewrap, the less than prominent posting of its terms of service and pri-
vacy policy make the agreement process more similar to browsewrap
than clickwrap.
Facebook must change its sign-up process to be more like tradi-
tional clickwrap in order to obtain its users’ consent.  To start, before
being permitted to click on “I Accept,” Facebook should require a poten-
tial user to scroll through the terms of service, including any privacy
rights “sold” as consideration for Facebook’s promise to let the user con-
tinue to use the website.  By doing so, Facebook would place the user on
reasonable notice that his or her likeness, name, and other information
may become a commodity that may be sold or used for advertising pur-
poses upon the completion of the sign-up process when the user clicks on
“I Accept.”  While each user may not stop to read the terms, the simple
scrolling through the terms gives reasonable notice that some terms were
being assented to upon the completion of the sign-up process.165  If a
user neglects to read the terms, reasonable notice was given even though
the user declined to read the terms of the agreement.  This leads to mu-
tual assent despite the user failing to adequately inform herself of
Facebook’s terms.
Finally, to fend off possible future litigation over its privacy policy
and terms of service, Facebook should make clear that sign up constitutes
a bargained for exchange.  Many potential users may not realize that
signing up to Facebook is similar to a written contract or the purchase of
other goods or services.  This may be most important to the parents of
the 20 million minors who are Facebook members, 7.5 million of who
are under the age of thirteen,166 because the parents likely do not realize
that Facebook is selling and distributing information about their children
to unknown individuals for advertising and other unknown purposes.167
If Facebook makes the above recommended changes, it would rem-
edy the browsewrap problems and give reasonable notice to users of the
165 See supra text accompanying note 42.
166 See Katherine Noyes, Marketer Beware: 7.5 Million Facebook Users are Kids,
PCWORLD (May 12, 201110:40 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/227755/marketer_be-
ware_75_million_facebook_users_are_kids.html; CR Survey: 7.5 Million Facebook Users are
Under the Age of 13, Violating the Site’s Terms, CONSUMER REPORTS, (May 10, 2011), http://
pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/2011/05/cr-survey-75-million-facebook-users-are-
under-the-age-of-13-violating-the-sites-terms-.html.  Facebook’s terms of service does require
that its users be at least thirteen years old. See Data Use Policy, supra note 151 (“Here are
some commitments you make to us relating to registering and maintaining the security of your
account: . . .  You will not use Facebook if you are under 13.”).
167 Some have become concerned with the collection of private information from minors
by companies and their websites.  For example, in Massachusetts, there is currently proposed
legislation that would prohibit companies that provide schools with a cloud-computing service
from using information gleaned from students for any type of commercial purpose, including
advertising use. See Jacob Gerhman & Shira Ovide, Microsoft Backs School Privacy Bill
Taking Aim at Google, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2013, at B5.
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terms of the sign-up agreement.  Thus, Facebook’s terms of service
would survive a legal challenge.
CONCLUSION
The right to privacy is an important right in a free society and is
more critical than the right to select a location for litigation.  Public pol-
icy dictates that the right to privacy cannot be yielded unknowingly.
Many hold their privacy rights to high esteem,  as evidenced by the mul-
titude of Supreme Court Cases involving the right to privacy168 and pub-
lic relations issues faced by companies for infringing on the rights of
their customers.169  A violation of the right to privacy, whether by a pri-
vate actor or the government,170 causes uproar throughout American so-
ciety.  Facebook, a social media website used by millions of Americans,
is not exempt from the duty to refrain from infringing upon another’s
privacy rights with proper notice.
In the past, Facebook has shown a willingness to infringe on the
privacy rights of its social media users without giving the users reasona-
ble notice about exchange that occurs upon the completion of Facebook’s
sign-up process.  With the current Facebook sign-up process, the lack of
reasonable notice of terms or changes of terms, which in previous inci-
dents caused users to be concerned about their privacy rights, occurs
once again.  With the Internet’s changing landscape, “[t]he protection
granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation.”171  The
broader foundation of future privacy rights must be grounded in reasona-
ble notice to a contracting party when the party’s privacy rights are sold
without the ability for the user to terminate the agreement and regain the
private information.
168 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
169 See supra Part III; see also Elizabeth A. Harris &and Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the
Breach Numbers Grow, N.Y.TIMES (Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/11/business/target-breach-affected-70-million-customers.html?rref=business&_r=0.
170 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
171 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 211.
